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Frank. William Hausladen, Jr., Pro Se
Appellant
516 ½ Oak Street
Sandpoint, ID 83 864

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FRANK WILLIAM HAUSLADEN, JR.
Appellant,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

SHARI COLENE KNOCHE
Defendant,
JOHN H. SAHLIN,

)
)
)
)
)

S. Ct. No. 40274

BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR
REVIEW
(I.A.R. 118)

)

Judgment Creditor on Appeal-Respondent, )

COMES NOW, the above-named Appellant, pursuant to I.A.R. 116 & 42 and
petitions this Court for a rehearing of the Court of Appeals' ORDER dated October 7, 2013
and 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 637S dated 12-12-13 (the third substituted opinion).
FACTORS UNDER I.A.R. 118 THAT ARE PRESENT:
1. The Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not in accord with
applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court;
2. The Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not in accord with the
Idaho Constitution, Idaho law, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and/or Idaho
Appellate Rules.
3. The Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise the Idaho Supreme Court's power of
superv1s10n.
4. The alternative issues on appeal relate to questions of substance not previously
determined by the Idaho Supreme Court.
Brief in Support of
Petition for Review
I.A.R. 118

OVERVIEW/INTRODUCTION
The issues set forth herein ask the questions: (I) can an Idaho appellate court
"deem" itself to reaquire jurisdiction after a remittitur was issued and (2) is a "parenting
coordinator" still a "parenting coordinator" four (4) months after being dismissed by order
of the magistrate court. The Court of Appeals said "yes" to both questions above even
though both decisions were clearly outside of the law and contrary to the facts.
Appellant has one question to the Idaho Supreme Court: Will you correct these
flagrant "errors" or adopt them as your own through inaction? 1

ISSUES:
I.

The Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to change/alter/amend the substituted opinion
dated August 27, 2013, cited as 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 673S after September
17, 2013.

II. In the alternative, if this Court refuses to set aside the ORDER dated October 7, 2013:
a. The standing analysis on pages 3 - 4 of Unpublished Opinion No. 673S
contains a mistake in law and fact as John Sahlin:
1.

was not a Parenting Coordinator (as required in LR.C.P. 16(1)
and LC. Section 32-717D) at the relevant time, and

11.

did not file a motion for fees (as required in LR.C.P. 16(1) and
LC. Section 32-717D) and therefore lacked standing to pursue
his cause of action in this case;

b. Sahlin was not the prevailing party, Hausladen was the prevailing party
and is entitled to costs pursuant to LA.R. 40.
FACTS

(1) The Idaho Court of Appeals issued an opinion that "reversed and remanded" the
issue on appeal to the district court and awarded "costs to Sahlin" on 8-23-13.
1

The standing issue has been ignored up until the Court of Appeals "deemed" Sahlin was a "parenting
coordinator" even after he was dismissed by court order. If the standing issue is not properly addressed by
this Court, the Court will be presented with the issue in the near future as it is doubtful the Kootenai County
district court will acknowledge the issue's existence.
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(2) On or about 8-23-13, Appellant called the Supreme Court Clerk's office an
inquired whether the award of costs to Sahlin was an error since the district
court's ruling was "reversed and remanded" and Sahlin was not the Appellant.
The employee at the Supreme Court Clerk's office assured Hausladen that the
issue would be looked into and a substitute opinion would be issued if the cost
award was an error/mistake.
(3) On 8-27-13, the Idaho Court of Appeals issued a substitute opm1on which
mirrored the 8-23-13 opinion except for award of costs was changed from Sahlin
to Hausladen. Hausladen/Appellant filed a memorandum of costs on or about 828-13.
(4) On 8-28-13, Appellant mailed his Memorandum of Costs to the Idaho Court of
Appeals which disclosed costs in the amount of$987.81.
(5) On or about 9-6-2013, Sahlin filed (mailed) an "OBJECTION TO AWARD OF
COSTS ON APPEAL." In the first paragraph of said document, Sahlin cited that
said document was filed "[p ]ursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40(d)" but was
essentially an argument that Hausladen was not the prevailing party and should
not have been awarded costs.
(6) On or about 9-16-13 Appellant mailed (which was apparently received by the
Court of Appeals on 9-18-13) an objection to Sahlin's Objection to Award of
Costs which stated that Sahlin was required to physically file a Petition for
Rehearing (with the $71.00 filing fee) within 21 days of the publish date of the
substitute opinion. Since Sahlin had not done this, all of his arguments were moot
and Appellant was entitled to all costs set forth in his Memorandum of Costs
(987.81).
(7) Pursuant to LA.R.122 & 38(b), the substitute op1mon dated 8-27-13 which
"awarded costs to Hausladen" became "final" on 9-17-13.

Brief in Support of
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(8) On 9-18-13, the Remittitur was issued which included:

"IT IS HEREBY

FURTHER ORDERED that Sahlin's costs on appeal will be addressed in a
subsequent order."2
(9) Chief Justice Gutierrez issued an "ORDER" on 9-20-13 (apparently in response to
Appellant's brief filed on or about September 16, 2013) stating that the Court of
Appeals was "treat[ing]" Sahlin's "OBJECTION TO AWARD OF COSTS ON
APPEAL" as a petition for rehearing on the question of the "prevailing party."
The "ORDER" is silent as to the legal basis for the holding.
(10)

On or about 10-3-13, Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss (Sahlin's

"deemed" Petition for Rehearing) & Objection to 9-20-13 Order.

Appellant

argued that Chief Judge Gutierrez's order was void for lack of jurisdiction.3
(11)

On 10-7-13, Chief Judge Gutierrez issued another order (apparently in

response to Appellant's Motion to Dismiss Petition for Rehearing) which did not
directly acknowledged Appellant's legal arguments but "withdrew" its 9-20-13
order and dismissed Appellant's Motion to Dismiss because it was now "moot".
The Court of Appeals also "withdrew" the Remittitur dated 9-16-13 and reissued
its original opinion dated 8-23-13 and denied Hausladen's Memorandum of Costs.
The October 7, 2013 Order failed to cite any authority or legal basis for its
holding.
(12)

Thereafter Appellant timely filed (and paid the $71.00 filing fee) a

Petitioner for Rehearing and a Petition for Review.
(13)

Although the Court of Appeals somehow "resurrected" jurisdiction over

this issue on appeal, the Kootenai County District Court has done the following
since the case was "recalled" back to the Court of Appeals:
a. On 10-23-13, District Judge Rich Christiansen (who replaced Judge Luster
who was on the appeal) filed a disqualification;
2

Appellant does not know if this was a mistake/clerical error but it obviously conflicts with the "final"
substitute opinion issued by the Court since costs were awarded to Hausladen.
3 Appellant argued that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction since no action was taken by the Court of
Appeals within 2 I days of the date of the substituted order, Sahlin had failed to file a Petition for
Rehearing, Sahlin had failed to pay the required $71.00 filing fee (at all let alone timely).
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b. On 10-24-13, District Judge John Mitchell was appointed in the case; and
c. ON 11-5-2013, District Judge Mitchell issued "Order for Hearing and
Setting of Briefing Schedule on Administrative Appeal".
(14) On December 12, 2013, the Court of Appeals issued an order denying Appellant's
Petition for Rehearing and issued a substitute opinion that changed (for the third time) the
award of costs to neither party. 4

LAW & ANALYSIS
I.

The Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to change/alter/amend the substituted
opinion dated August 27, 2013, cited as 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 673S
after September 17, 2013.
Under

Idaho

law,

the

Court

of

Appeals

does

not

retain

authority/power/jurisdiction over a case forever. As set forth in the rules 5, 21 days after
the issuance of the substituted order, the Court of Appeals automatically, by law, loses
authority/power/jurisdiction over a case. After the 21 days have expired, both Appellant
and Respondent are barred from changing the decision. 6 Likewise, the Court of Appeals
is barred from changing the outcome of the case (modifying its opinion).
Pursuant to I.AR. 38, the substituted opinion dated 8-27-13 became "final"
twenty-one (21) days after it was issued. By law, the substituted opinion could not be
altered, amended or changed after 9-1 7-13.
The Chief Justice's order dated 9-20-13 "deemed" Sahlin's objection to the award
of costs to be a petition for rehearing and inherently "deemed" that the required $71.00
filing fee was paid timely. As the facts obviously show, neither happened. Following
Appellant's objections to the 9-20-13 order, the Chief Justice changed the "reason" for
exercising jurisdiction (after the remittitur was issued) with the same result - changing
the award of costs (prevailing party). Although the 10-7-13 order attempts to justify its
actions because an "error" occurred, nothing was disclosed earlier about an "error" - the
4

Costs were originally awarded to Sahlin, then to Hausladen, then back to Sahlin, now to neither party.
See I.A.R. 38.
6 By filing either a Petition for Rehearing or a Petition for Review - see I.A.R. 21 & 42.
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Court of Appeals tried to allow Sahlin to appeal the prevailing party analysis without
timely filing a Petition for Review and timely paying a $71.00 filing fee. Only after
Appellant filed to dismiss the "deemed" Petition for Review did the Court of Appeals
attempt to justify its extra-jurisdictional reach because of an "error". If an "error" had
actually occurred the Court of Appeals would have issued an order similar to the 10-0713 order on 9-20-13 (called the alleged "error" and "error" first instead of a "deemed"
petition for review and a $71.00 to be paid when it was not). On December 12, 2013, the
(third) substitute opinion has now changed the "prevailing party" analysis again. The
Court of Appeals' own orders/opinions clearly illustrate that it merely kept changing its
mind on an issue (which is not a legitimate reason for "recalling" a remittitur as set
forth in the case below).

The rules set forth above regarding time limits for filing a petition for review
and/or petition for rehearing and remittitur are JURISDICTIONAL in nature and are set
in stone. Just like when a notice of appeal is not timely filed, it is jurisdictional in
nature. 7 Cases such as State v. Hartwig, 8 State v. Iverson,9 State v. Johnson, 10 Lohman v.
State, 11 and Amboh are just a few cases that illustrate lack of jurisdiction issues on
appeal/remand. When an appellate court loses jurisdiction of a case it cannot (legally) be
recalled since the appellate court lacks the power/authority/jurisdiction to do so.
I.AR. 101 12 requires three (3) judges to constitute a quorum and two (2) must
concur to pronounce a decision or render an opinion. It appears that both the 9-20-13
Order and the 10-7-13 order also violates this rule as only Chief Judge Gutierrez is
attempting to change the substituted opinion by himself. Clearly, the law (rules) do not
allow one judge to unilaterally change the opinion of a quorum.
I.A.R. 112 states that "[a]ll opinions, decisions, orders and remittiturs of the Court
of Appeals shall be as prescribed by the Idaho Appellate Rules." I.A.R. 122 further states
See Amboh v. State, 149 Idaho 650.
150 Idaho 326 (20 I l ).
9 79 fdaho 25 (1957).
10 75 Idaho 157 (1954).
11 138 Idaho l (2002).
12 See also: Idaho Constitution Article V, Section 2; I.C. Section 1-2403, 1-2407, 1-2408 and l-2409.
Brief in Support of
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that opinions and remittiturs must be issued in accordance to I.A.R. 38 unless a petition
for review is granted by the Supreme Court and the assignment to the Court of Appeals
will terminate and no remittitur shall issue on the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to modify the terms (such as changing
the prevailing party) of the substituted opinion dated 8-27-13 and lacked jurisdiction to
"withdraw" a remittitur under these circumstances and re-exercise jurisdiction over this
case. The orders dated 9-20-13 and 10-7-13 are void for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court should have realized this basic, fundamental jurisdictional "problem"
prior to issuing the 9-20-13 Order. "The question of jurisdiction is fundamental and
cannot be ignored. Even if jurisdictional questions are not raised by the parties, the

Court must address them on its own initiative." 13 (emphasis added).

"Even if

jurisdictional questions are not raised by the parties, we are obligated to address them,
when applicable, on our own initiative. . . "Further, parties cannot confer jurisdiction
upon the court by stipulation, agreement or estoppel." 14 Cases such as Amboh v. State,
149 Idaho 650 (Ct.App. 2012) and State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326 (2010) demonstrate
that appeal filing deadlines are absolute and failure to comply result in dismissal (even in
criminal cases where an individual's freedom is at stake).
The Idaho Court of Appeals did not substitute/modify/republish the August 27,
2013 substitute opinion. Therefore, on September 17, 2013, the conclusions set forth in
the August 27, 2013, substitute opinion (including "costs to Hausladen") become
irrevocable and, in essence, "written in stone." Neither Appellant or Respondent has the
ability to modify its contents by filing a petition for rehearing and/or a petition for review
with the Supreme Court. Likewise, the issuing court is bound by the appellate rules and
jurisdictional limitations and is barred from modifying an opinion once it has
automatically become "final."
Diamond v. Sandpoint Title Insurance, 132 Idaho 145, 148 (1998) citing H & V Eng'g, Inc. v. Idaho
State Bd. Of Prof! Eng'rs & Land Surveyors, I 13 Idaho 646, 747 P.2d 55, 57 (1987).
14 H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State B. of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646,
648 ( 1987). SEE ALSO these additional cases that more specifically analyze jurisdictional issues on
appeal: State v. Iverson, 79 Idaho 25 (1957), State v. Johnson, 75 Idaho 157 (1954), Lohman v. State, 138
Idaho l (2002).
Brief in Support of
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Pursuant to IAR 38(b), twenty-one (21) days after the announcement of the
substitute opinion (September 17, 2013), the substitute opinion "automatically" became
final (including the award of costs to Hausladen) under the appellate rules.

On

September 18, 2013, the Court of Appeals issued the remittitur with the caveat that" ...
Sahlin's costs on appeal will be addressed in a subsequent order." 15 The "catch 22" at
this point is that the Court of Appeals has already awarded costs to Hausladen and
following the remittitur, has no jurisdiction over that issue other than awarding or not
awarding costs to Hausladen pursuant to IAR 42 (any costs not specifically allowed
under IAR 42 are denied and all costs specifically set forth in IAR 42 are awarded).
As set forth above, nothing in the Idaho Appellate Rules allows a remittitur to be
"recalled" and caselaw on the issue is very limited in scope.
There appears to be one Idaho Supreme Court case relating to this issue: State v.
Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623 (1921 ), the Idaho Supreme Court recalled a remittitur for the first
time and stated: "The questions involved here are of the utmost importance to appellant,
and every consideration of justice demands that this court determine its power to both
recall remittitur and to reduce the punishment in this case, and the punishment be reduced
if the facts do not warrant the imposition of the death penalty." Id at 631. The court
further reasoned:

"We have, therefore, after very careful consideration, reached the

conclusion that it is our duty to recall the remittitur, and to modify the judgment to the
extent that the sentence to be inflicted be that of life imprisonment at hard labor in lieu of
inflicting the death penalty, and the judgment is so modified. Id at 637-38. In short, the
Idaho Supreme Court recalled a remittitur in order to save a person's life. 16
Other states have allowed a remittitur to be recalled but only under very, very
special circumstances. In California:

Other than for the correction of clerical errors, the recall may be
ordered on the ground of fraud, mistake or inadvertence. The recall
may not be granted to correct judicial error . . .[A] decision is
inadvertent if it is the result of oversight, neglect or accident, as
15

It is assumed that this was a typographical error since the substitute opinion awarded costs to Hausladen.
Pursuant to LC. Section 19-2821, the Idaho Supreme Court was empowered to do so (alter a sentence)
uni! 1977 when said statute was repealed by the Idaho Legislature.
Briefin Support of
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distinguished from judicial error." (Southwest Inv. Corp. v. City of
L.A. (1952) 38 Cal.2d 623,626,241 P.2d 985.) 17
In Wisconsin:
There is no equivalent to Wis. Stat. (Section) 806.07(1)(a) in the
rules of appellate procedure for either the court of appeals or this
court. W agree with the court of appeals that as the rules of appellate
procedure are currently constituted, an appellate court's jurisdiction
over a cause ceases upon remittitur in the absence of inadvertence,
fraud, or a void judgment. Wis Stat. [Section] 809.26; State v.
American TV and Appliance of Madison, Inc., 151 Wis.2d 175, 17880, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989). 18
In Missouri:
Ordinarily, when a court has jurisdiction to render a judgment
which is not the result of fraud, imposition or prejudicial mistakes of
facts, a remittitur which has been duly issued thereon may not be
recalled or quashed to correct mere errors of law or procedure.
Whenever the judgment of an appellate court impinges upon the
federal constitution~( rights of the accused, however, the mistake
cannot be said to be a 'mere [error] of law or procedure.'
Consequently, our courts have properly recognized that a mandate
may be recalled in order to remedy a desrivation of the federal
constitutional rights of a criminal defendant.
Other states, such as Georgia, 20 Maine, 21 New Mexico22, Washington,23 , and
Oklahoma24 have almost the same "rule" (via caselaw).
In this case, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion that "reversed and remanded"
the district court's dismissal of appellant's appeal from district court and awarded costs to
Sahlin (the respondent). Within a week thereafter, the Court of Appeals substituted its
Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com., 188 Cal.Rptr. I 04, I 08,655 P.2d 306 (Cal. 1982).
State ex rel. Fuentes v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District IV, 593 N.W.2d 48, 51, 225 Wis.2d 446
(Wis. 1999).
19 State v. Thompson, 659 S.W. 2d 766, 768-769 (Mo. 1983).
20 See Davidson v. Calllaway. 559 S.E.2d 728 (Ga. 2002).
21 See Tyson v. Whitaker & Son, Inc., 411 A.2d 389 {Me., 1980).
22 See Woodson v. Lee. 74 N.M. 227 {N.M. 1964).
23 See Hong v. Washington State Health, 192 P.3d 21 {Wa.App. 2008)
24 See L'ggrke v. Sherman, 223 P.3d 383 {Ok 2009).
Brief in Support of
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original opm1on and changed the award of costs "to Hausladen" (appellant).

After

remittitur was issued, the Idaho Court of Appeals decided to "treat" Sahlin's objection to
the award or costs as a "Petition for Rehearing."

Following Appellant's motion to

dismiss 25 the "deemed" "Petition for Rehearing", the Court of Appeals then issued an order
and "deemed" the remittitur to be recalled. The Court of Appeals then corrected what it
termed simply as an "error" and changed the cost award back "to Sahlin." The Court of
Appeals then changed the award of costs for the third time to "no costs to either party."
Although, as the cases above show, "error" is not a legally recognized reason to recall a
remittitur26 , "error" was not the reason in this case either since the Court of Appeals "recorrected" the "corrected error" in its 12-12-2013 third substituted opinion. The Court of
Appeals merely kept changing its mind on the award of costs and its remand of the
remittitur was void for lack of jurisdiction and the original substituted opinion of the award
of costs "to Hausladen" must be reinstated.

II.

In the alternative, if this Court refuses to set aside the ORDER dated October 7,
2013:
a. The standing analysis on pages 3 - 4 of Unpublished Opinion No. 673S (the
third substituted opinion dated 12-12-13) contains a mistake in law and fact
as John Sahlin:
1. was not a Parenting Coordinator (as required in I.R.C.P. 16(1) and
I.C. Section 32-717D), and
11. did not file a motion for fees (as required in I.R.C.P. 16(1) and LC.
Section 32-717D) and therefore lacked standing to pursue his cause
of action in this case;

25

Since respondent Sahlin never filed said petition and never paid the REQUIRED filing fee and the Court
of Appeals AUTOMATICALLY lost jurisidiction over the case.
26 See Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com., 188 Cal.Rptr. 104, 108,655 P.2d 306 (Cal.
1982) cited above.
Brief in Support of
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The Court of Appeals properly analyzed that Sahlin has never been a "party" to
this action in the substitute opinion. However, the Court of Appeals incorrectly found
that Sahlin was a "parenting coordinator" when presenting his "claim" and that Sahlin
properly presented his "claim". 27
Therefore, in order to take part in this case, John Sahlin must be a "parenting
coordinator" (as defined in LC. Section 32-717D) and properly present his claim as set
forth in LC. Section 32-717D and/or LR.C.P. 16(1).
However, the Court of Appeals failed to recognize the fact that John Sahlin was
not a Parenting Coordinator at the relevant time. 28 John Sahlin's position of Parenting
Coordinator was terminated by Judge Watson at a hearing on 12-30-05. In an order dated
1-11-06,29 Judge Watson wrote:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that John Sahlin's

appointment as Parenting Coordinator is terminated as of December 30, 2005." John
Sahlin filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause and for Entry of Judgment and Notice of
Hearing30 and a supporting Affidavit31 on May 17,2006

5 ½ months AFTER his

appointment was terminated.
As set forth above, John Sahlin was not a "parenting coordinator" after 12-30-05.
Judge Watson terminated all ties John Sahlin had with this case on 12-30-05. "Special
intervention status" is only reserved for a "parenting coordinator". As of May 17, 2006,
John Sahlin had no legal ties to this case and therefore clearly had no standing to
intervene.

The Court of Appeal's analysis ASSUMED Sahlin was a "parenting coordinator" when he filed his
request which the appellate record CLEARLY shows he was not and Sahlin filed a MOTION FOR
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE as a "pleading."
28 The Court of Appeals changed the plain, ordinary meaning of Idaho Code Section 32-717D (by allowing
an individual who clearly was not a "parenting coordinator" to be "treated" as a "parenting coordinator" for
purposes of collecting fees) and violates Article II, Section l of the Idaho Constitution. "It is the duty of
the legislature to make laws and the duty of the court to construe them and, if a law as construed by the
court is to be changed, that is a legislative, not judicial function." In re Speer, 53 Idaho 292 (1933).
29 Clerk's Record, S. Ct. Docket No. 40274-2012, Vol. I, page 138.
3 Clerk's Record, S. Ct. Docket No. 40274-2012, Vol. I, page 148.
31 Clerk's Record, S. Ct. Docket No. 40274-2012, Vol. I, page 150.
27

°
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1I

John Sahlin clearly did not file a "motion for fees" or anything similar thereto. 32
His "pleadings" amounted to a defective motion for order to show cause in which no
order to show cause was issued. Even if Sahlin had been a "parenting coordinator" at the
time he filed said documents, he clearly did not have standing to file a motion for order to
show cause since he was not a party to the action. Most importantly, Sahlin even failed
to state what rule his motion was based upon as required by I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l). 33 As set
forth in Appellant's prior briefing (incorporated herein by reference) Appellant objected
to this "motion" going forward and continued to object throughout the appeal process and
this "standing"34 issue was just ignored. Finally, the Court of Appeals noticed the issue
but ignored the plain fact that Sahlin was not a "parenting coordinator" AND failed to file
the proper documentation (follow the specific procedures). Two major reasons why
Sahlin had no standing, either of which is fatal to Sahlin's cause.
As stated before, Sahlin's actions go beyond the actions of Ken Adler in the
Abolafia35 case

at least Adler appeared to be taking action on behalf of the children (his

argument) whereas Sahlin was merely trying a shortcut method for collecting money for
ultra vires acts. No matter how you analyze it, Sahlin has been nothing more than an
"officious intermeddler" in this case since his termination on December 30, 2005.
As required by law, the Court must dismiss Sahlin's "cause of action" since he
lacked standing (on multiple levels) to pursue his "claim" in this case.
As set forth above, jurisdictional matters may be brought up for the first time on
appeal, Appellant's stance has been consistent on this issue throughout the long history of
this case: Sahlin has no standing to pursue a claim in a custody case which Sahlin is not
a party and not a parenting coordinator. This was argued before the "trial" (a hearing on

Clerk's Record, S. Ct. Docket No. 40274-2012, Vol. I, page 148 - 151 - NOTE: Sahlin failed to even
set forth a statute or rule
33 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(l) requires that: An application to the court for an order shall be by
motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity
the grounds therefore including the number of the applicable civil rule, ... [emphasis added).
34 As set forth above and Appellant's prior briefing, even if Appellant failed to properly object (which he
has) the Court, on its own initiative must investigate the "standing problem" since it is jurisdictional in
nature.
35 Abolafia v. Reeves, 152 Idaho 898, 902 (2012).
Brief in Support of
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Sahlin' s motion for order to show cause)3 6 commenced; on appeal in the district court;
on appeal in the Idaho Court of Appeals; on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court; on
remand in the magistrate court when it wrongfully exercised authority over the case and
attempted to "retry" the case (Judge Peterson); in district court (Judge Simpson and Judge
Luster) when said court transferred the case to magistrate court for a "determination"
before said court made a "deterrnination"37 ; in magistrate court (Judge Stow) when it
improperly exercised jurisdiction over the matter on remand; and finally on appeal to the
district court (Judge Luster) when said court wrongfully dismissed the appeal which is
currently the issue in this Court.

At some point, Appellant hopes that a court will

recognize that a former Parenting Coordinator is legally barred from intervening in a
custody case after his appointment has been terminated and a magistrate court lacks
jurisdiction to hear a former Parenting Coordinator's motion for order to show cause.

b. Sahlin was not the prevailing party, Hausladen was the prevailing party and
is entitled to costs pursuant to LA.R. 40.
"The" issue on appeal was that the Appellant's appeal in district court was
wrongfully dismissed. Appellant further argued that the whole case should be dismissed
due to several jurisdictional and procedural "problems" that have been raised by Appellant
over and over again only to be ignored. As analyzed above, Sahlin did not "win" the
standing issue because the Court of Appeals did not properly analyze it. Sahlin was not a
parenting coordinator and did not file a motion to determine fees and, therefore, did not
have standing to take part in this litigation.
Irregardless, the analysis set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Ranch v. Nord
Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716 (2005), sets forth the proper prevailing party
analysis: " ...the prevailing party question is examined and determined from an overall
view, not a claim-by-claim analysis."

38(emphasis

added). In this case Appellant presented

three (2) basic arguments, one for dismissal based on jurisdiction/procedure (with two(2)
36

Clerk's Record, S. Ct. Docket No. 40274-2012, Vol. 1, page 199.
Even though the Idaho Supreme Court order the district court to make the "determination."
38 Ranch at 133.
Brief in Support of
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subparts) and the main argument for reversal of the district court's wrongful dismissal of
the appeal. As argued above, the Sahlin lacks standing and his claim should be dismissed.
In its original (and substituted) opinion, the Court of Appeals "reversed and remanded" the
case to district court - looking at the appeal "from an overall view" Appellant is the
prevailing party.
Sahlin filed nothing in the district court when Judge Luster was attempting to
dismiss Appellant's appeal. Obviously, the reasons for dismissal of Appellant's appeal
were ridiculous

Sahlin had no real option other than to agree with Appellant in the Court

of Appeals - the law is clear on the issue. But Sahlin's acquiescence was too late

he

waited to change his position until AFTER Appellant was forced to pay a $109.00 filing
fee, pay $560 for the clerk's record and invest a substantial amount of time and effort in
briefing this issue. Sahlin's "noble" action of "agreeing" with Appellant came only after
Sahlin did not benefit from the district court's wrongful dismissal of Appellant's appeal
AND after Appellant was forced to pay substantial money and effort to have his appeal
reinstated. Sahlin's actions equate with a defendant agreeing to liability right before the
jury comes back with the verdict - it is too late. Sahlin should not be allowed to "hedge his

bets" in this manner - he changed sides too late - after Appellant was forced to incur the
costs associated with the appeal.
The big question is: Would Sahlin have been the "prevailing party" if the district
court's holding was not reversed and remanded? Of course he would have - in that
instance, as the Respondent (with no cross-appeals) he would be the "prevailing party". So
how can Sahlin be even in the running for the award of costs {as a Respondent with no
cross-appeals) when the issue on appeal is "reversed and remanded."

Ranch and

subsequent cases39 hold that Appellant, on an overall view, is the prevailing party for
purposes of costs.

See also: Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic,152 Idaho 540 (2012), Hardenbrook v. UPS, D.C. No. l:07-ev00509-ELJ-CWD (9th Cir. 2012); Advanced Medical Diagnostics v. Imaging Center of Idaho, 2013
Opinion No. 71 (S. Ct. 2013).
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CONCLUSION

As set forth above, the Court of Appeals lacks the authority/power/jurisdiction to
change an opinion after said court's jurisdiction is transferred back to the district court.
The substituted opinion dated 8-27-13 which awarded costs to Hausladen remains as the
"final" opinion of the Court of Appeals as the Court of Appeals' orders dated 9-20-13
and 10-7-13 are void for lack of jurisdiction. Hausladen was awarded costs in what is
now the '"final" opinion of this Court and timely filed a memorandum of costs, all of
which fit squarely within the requirements of I.A.R. 40. Hausladen is entitled to costs in
the amount of $987.81.
In the alternative (if the Court fails to find the 9-20-13 and 10-7-13 orders void)
Sahlin lacked standing to take part in a custody case AFTER he was dismissed as a
parenting coordinator, therefore, Sahlin's claims are dismissed and costs are awarded to
Hausladen as the prevailing party on appeal.
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